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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory can be used to study the interactions of different cell phenotypes
and describe tumor population dynamics. Instead of killing tumor cells, clinical treatment
could aim to change the nature of the evolutionary game– enabling healthy cells to outcom-
pete malignant cells. Most applications of evolutionary game theory to tumor growth have
considered the tumor as a homogeneously mixing population that is governed by the repli-
cator equation. We model the tumor population as an interacting particle system (IPS),
with discrete individuals, stochastic local interactions, and explicit spatial consideration.
Using this model, we see how predictions are changed when space is taken into account.
In particular, we consider Basanta’s work on glioma progression [3], the analysis of multi-
ple myeloma proposed by Dingli et al. [8], and Tomlinson’s model for tumors containing
cytotoxin-producing cells [15]. Our model agrees with Basanta’s in that we should have co-
existence between the three tumor phenotypes, but the spatial model allows coexistence in a
significantly wider region of parameter space. Dingli’s tumor population exhibits bistability
in a certain parameter regime. Our spatial model predicts a transition between the two
stable states at a critical parameter value, so there is no bistability. In Tomlinson’s game,
the IPS does not allow for coexistence between cell types.
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Introduction
The theory of evolutionary games was introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R.
Price to study ecological competitions [13]. However 15 years ago, Tomlinson suggested that
it could be used to study interactions between tumor cells [14, 15]. More recently, Axelrod,
Axelrod, and Pienta [1] explained how the cooperation of cancer and normal cells can bring
on mutually beneficial events such as angiogenesis (the development of blood vessels). In a
series of papers Basanta and coauthors studied the role of glycolysis in glioma progression
and invasion [3, 2]. Dingli et al. [8] studied the interactions between osteoclasts, osteoblasts,
and tumor cells in multiple myeloma. Finally, we look at Tomlinson and Bodmer’s model
for a tumor with cells that produce cytotoxin [15].
All of these analyses assume that the population of cells is homogeneously mixing while in
reality, each cells compete only with those nearby. Durrett and Levin [9] showed that the
introduction of explicit spatial structures can change the qualitative behavior of a game.
They consider four different approaches to modeling evolutionary games. The mean field
approach assumes that every individual interacts with every other with equal probability.
This assumption gives the benefit of often analytically tractable ODE models. Patch models
group individuals into homogeneously mixing patches, with possible migration in between,
but no other spatial structure. Reaction-diffusion equations have individuals as continuous
concentrations that can diffuse through space and interact only locally. Finally, interacting
particle systems have discrete individuals and treat space explicitly. There are analytical
results that give limiting reaction diffusion equations for interacting particle systems in the
hydrodynamic limit [5] [10]. Here, we will consider an IPS model for several games, compar-
ing the results to those of earlier mean-field models.
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Materials and Methods
Game Theoretic Model
In evolutionary game theory (EGT), it is common to use an ordinary differential equation
(ODE) model based on pairwise interactions. Suppose that we have n cell types. Let xi
denote the fraction of the population that is cell type i. We must have
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. Then,
the state of the population, ~x can be represented as a point on the n-dimensional simplex.
The time-evolution of this state is given by the replicator equation. For each i,
x˙i = xi(Wi −W )
whereWi is the fitness of cell type i andW is the average fitness. Suppose that the fitness pay-
off due to the interaction between cell types depends linearly on the cell proportions. We can
write a payoff matrix, G, that captures the results of this interaction. Then Wi(~x) = ~ei ·G~x
and W = ~x>G~x.
In this paper, we are chiefly interested in 3-strategy games, with a payoff matrix of the form
G =

1 2 3
1 a b c
2 d e f
3 g h k

Entry Gij of the matrix contains the payoff to a user of strategy i when it encounters a user
of strategy j.
As shown in Hofbauer and Sigmund [11] adding constants to the columns does not change
the replicator dynamics. We can then always subtract the appropriate constants to get the
diagonal to be 0.
A =

0 α θ
β 0 γ
δ ρ 0

To understand the replicator dynamics we can consider the pairwise interactions of the three
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types. In general, for a 2 strategy game, we have the matrix
A =
0 α
β 0

If β < 0 and α > 0, Strategy 1 dominates Strategy 2. If β > 0 and α < 0, Strategy 2
dominates Strategy 1. Otherwise, we have an equilibrium where the fitness of Strategy 1 is
equal to the fitness of Strategy 2 for some proportions. If the proportion of Strategy 1 users
is p, we have an equilibrium at
α(1− p) = βp
p¯ =
α
α + β
We need α and β have the same sign to have a fixed point (except for the degenerate case
where one or both are zero). Consider a perturbation from this equilibrium that introduces
more users of Strategy 1, so we have a frequency p¯ +  for  > 0. For stability, we need the
fitness of the second type to be greater after this perturbation.
β
(
α
α + β
+ 
)
> α
(
β
α + β
− 
)
Then we have,
α + β > 0
Since α and β had to have the same sign for the fixed point to exist, the equilibrium is stable
if and only if α, β > 0.
When we have a two-strategy equilibrium, we can then check whether the a population of
third strategy users can invade. For this, we need the fitness of the third type to be greater
than that of the other two at the equilibrium point.
δ
α
α + β
+ ρ
β
α + β
> β
α
α + β
→
Thus, the invadability condition is,
δα + ρβ > βα
Spatial Refinement
According to the ODE model, the fitness of a given individual depends upon the state of
the population as a whole. However, when individuals are distributed in space, this fitness
should only depend upon interactions with nearby neighbors. If the population is homo-
geneously mixing, all sites are neighbors. The replicator equation can then be viewed as a
mean-field approximation to a spatial game. As shown by Durrett and Levine, including
spatial effects can have important implications for the dynamics [9].
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In our model, cells are represented as points on the lattice Zd, initialized to one phenotype.
The neighborhood of a given cell refers to the von Neumann neighborhood. In 3 dimensions,
this consists of the 6 cells with which it shares a face. The fitness of a given cell is computed
by summing over the payoffs for interactions with each neighbor. The payoffs are taken
from the payoff matrix for the particular game under consideration. The time-evolution of
the lattice is given by choosing a cell at random and replacing it with one of its neighbors,
chosen with probability proportional to fitness. Figure 1 gives a graphical explanation in
two dimensions.
There are a few metrics one can use to characterize the behavior of our model. A good way
to show coexistence is to look at cell type frequencies over time. If they are stable over long
periods of time or have sustained oscillations, this might indicate coexistence. The lattice
used must be large enough that stochastic fluctuations in population do not accidentally
eliminate a cell type, in which case the predicted dynamics could be far off. As long as this
is satisfied, the initial conditions should not matter. In our simulations, cells are initialized
randomly to a certain type, as shown in Figure 2. This is true of stochastic models as dis-
cussed in Durrett and Levin [9], which have infinite size. The dynamics of interest tend to
take place at a characteristic length scale, so the lattice we use must be large enough to
capture them. To determine this, we need a metric to quantify the size of the structures
we observe in the spatial model. We define the degree of clustering as the ratio of identical
neighbor pairs to total neighbor pairs, considering all pairs in the lattice. If the clustering
tends to keep increasing, this might indicate that the chosen lattice is not large enough.
After some trial and error, we settled on a lattice of size 75 x 75 x 75 with periodic boundary
conditions (torus). Around this size, the clustering statistic for simulations that exhibit co-
existence is steady well below 1. In smaller simulations, the clustering statistic goes to 1 and
the output is noisier. Initially, simulations were run in 2 dimensions, but the model behaved
poorly as the voter model (described below) has no nontrivial stationary distribution in 2
dimensions. Only consensus is possible due to clustering [6].
One can arrive at analytical results for two-strategy games by considering voter model per-
turbations. Cox, Durrett, and Perkins consider the limiting reaction diffusion equations that
arise from perturbations of the voter model [?]. The discrete time voter model is a Markov
process on the d-dimensional lattice, Zd. One can think of the model as describing people
voting on an issue. Each site is an individual who holds the opinion 0 or 1. The state of the
model at time t is ξt : Zd → {0, 1}, with ξt(x) giving the opinion of the voter at site x at
time t. Let Λ be the entire lattice. Site x will switch states at a rate
c(x, ξt) =
∑
y∈Λ
p(x, y)I (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y))
where p is a symmetric probability kernel. The indicator I (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) is an indicator
that is 1 when the state of site y is different from that of site x. In particular, one can
let p be the transition function for the symmetric random walk in d dimensions, where
p(x, y) = (2d)−1I(| x− y |= 1). In this case, a cell only cares about the opinion of adjacent
cells, and all adjacent cells are given equal weight. In discrete time, one can consider Moran
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updating, where sites are randomly chosen and updated according to the preceding rule.
Analytic results can be obtained in the weak selection limit, with a game matrix of the form
1 +ωA, where 1 is a matrix of 1’s, with small ω > 0, and game matrix A. This allows treat-
ment as a voter model perturbation, as the effect of selection is small compared to choosing
neighbors uniformly at random. In a pre-print, Rick Durrett shows that introducing space is
equivalent to a transformation of the game matrix and replacing the replicator ODE shown
earlier with a related PDE. There has been progress made on the three-strategy case, but
there are few analytical results to guide the analysis as of now.
Figure 1: An example of a spatial Moran update. The cell marked green is randomly selected
to die. The fitness of each red neighbor is computed using its yellow neighbors (including
the dead cell). Finally, the update is made.
Figure 2: An example of a possible initial condition. Red, Green, and Blue represent different
cell types.
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Results
Case 1: Glioblastoma Game
Basanta et al. [3] used EGT to study interactions between different tumor cell phenotypes
found in glioblastomas. They were able to explain several observed features of glioma pro-
gression, such as a switch to glycolytic respiration. This less efficient type of metabolism
is not usually observed in human cells, which perform aerobic respiration. In their model,
there are three tumor phenotypes:
1. Autonomous growth (AG) are standard tumor cells that replicate continuously
2. Invasive (INV) cells flee upon encountering another type
3. Glycolytic (GLY) cells use glycolysis for their metabolic needs. This is less efficient
than aerobic respiration, and cells generally adopt it when a tumor is insufficiently
oxygenated.
We have the following interaction terms, which are assumed to be positive:
• The base payoff is 1. When 2 AG, 2 GLY, or an AG and GLY meet, they split this.
• k : Cost of switching to glycolytic respiration
• n : GLY cells acidify their microenvironment, harming neighboring cells. GLY cells
gain payoff n while AG cells suffer cost n. INV cells run away.
• c : Cost of fleeing. INV cells flee from other cell types, obtaining the full base payoff
elsewhere. When 2 INV meet, they split c.
Thus, we have the following payoff table:
A =

AG INV GLY
AG 1
2
1 1
2
− n
INV 1− c 1− c
2
1− c
GLY 1
2
+ n− k 1− k 1
2
− k

Adding the appropriate constants, we have,
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A =

0 c
2
k − n
1
2
− c 0 1
2
+ k − c
−(k − n) c
2
− k 0

1. AG vs INV
B =
 0 c2
1
2
− c 0

(a) If c ≥ 1
2
, AG dominates INV.
(b) If c < 1
2
, we have an equilibrium at
pAG =
c
1− c
pINV =
1− 2c
1− c
The equilibrium is stable, since 0 < c < 1
2
.
2. INV vs GLY
B =
 0 12 + k − c
c
2
− k 0

(a) If k > c− 1
2
and k > c
2
, INV dominates GLY. This is equivalent to k > c
2
for c ∈ [0, 1].
(b) If k < c− 1
2
and k < c
2
, GLY dominates INV. This can only occur for c ≥ 1
2
, where the
condition is equivalent to k < c− 1
2
.
(c) If k > c− 1
2
and k < c
2
, we have a stable INV-GLY equilibrium at
(
1
2
+ k − c)(1− p) = ( c
2
− k)p
p¯INV =
1 + 2k − 2c
1− c
p¯GLY =
c− 2k
1− c
For c < 1
2
, this is equivalent to k < c
2
(d) If k < c − 1
2
and k > c
2
, we have an unstable INV-GLY equilibrium. This is impossible
for c ∈ [0, 1].
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3. AG vs. GLY
B =
 0 k − n
n− k 0

(a) If k > n, AG dominates GLY
(b) If k < n, GLY dominates AG
If k > n, AG dominates GLY. If n < k, GLY dominates AG.
4. Invadability of AG-INV equilibrium If the fitness of GLY at this fixed point is higher
than that of AG and INV, the equilibrium is invadable. We find
FGLY = (n− k) c
1− c + (
c
2
− k)1− 2c
1− c
=
cn− kc+ c/2− k − c2 + 2ck
1− c
and
FINV = (
1
2
− c) c
1− c
In order to have FGLY > FINV , we need
k <
cn
1− c
5. Invadability of INV-GLY equilibrium If the fitness of AG is higher at this fixed
point, the equilibrium is invadable. We find
FAG =
c
2
1 + 2k − 2c
1− c + (k − n)
c− 2k
1− c
=
c/2 + 2kc− c2 − 2k2 − cn+ 2nk
1− c
For the INV frequency,
FINV = (
c
2
− k)1 + 2k − 2c
1− c
=
c/2 + 3kc− c2 − 2k2 + kc− k
1− c
In order to have FAG > FINV , we need the constraint
k >
cn
1− c+ 2n
We can compute the location of the interior fixed point from the replicator equation. If the
2-species equilibria are invadable, it will be stable.
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Let ~p =
(
p1 p2 1− p1 − p2
)>
, noting that the frequencies of all the cell types must add
to 1. Then,
~W = A~p =

p2
2
+ p1n+
1
2
− n
1− c+ p2c
2
p1 ∗ n+ p22 + 12 − k

The average fitness is given by
W = ~p>A~p =
1
2
− k + kp1 + p2(1− c+ k)− p
2
2
2
(1− c)
To solve for the fixed point, we set W1 = W and W2 = W , yielding the internal fixed point
p∗AG =
2nk + k − nc− kc
2n2
p∗INV =
n− k
n
p∗GLY =
kc− k + cn
2n2
The coordinates must be in (0, 1), so we have the constraints
k >
cn
1− c+ 2n (1)
k <
cn
1− c (2)
k < n (3)
These constraints are equivalent to the invadability criteria, with the additional stipulation
that k < n. To double-check the invadability conditions, we can linearize around this fixed
point in order to compute its stability. The Jacobian must have negative real part when
evaluated at p∗. Solving, p∗ is only unstable for c > 1, n > c− 1
2
. The term c represents the
cost of motility, so it is not biologically realistic for it to be larger than 1, the base payoff.
Thus, as long as the fixed point p∗ exists, it is stable.
Stable fixed points of the replicator equation on the inside of the simplex are unique and
globally asymptotically stable [11]. The existence of such a point in the mean-field ODE
suggests that coexistence is possible in the stochastic spatial model [9]. Thus, we expect
AG, INV, and GLY to coexist for some parameter regime in our model.
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(a) Sample Output. Cells of type AG are red, INV green and GLY blue.
(b) Some sample trajectories of the spatial simulation plotted on the simplex. Each trajectory
begins at the center and is for a different choice of parameters.
Figure 3
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1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
c
n
Equilibrium
AG
AG−INV
Cyclic
Int
Glioblastoma Mean−Field Phase Diagram for k = 0.5
(a) In the ODE model, coexistence is only possible for a narrow band, indicated by Int. In the
cyclic region, GLY beats AG, AG beats INV, and INV beats GLY. AG-INV is a region where two
strategies coexist.
Phase Diagram for k = 0.5
(b) Equilibrium cell types for spatial simulation. Simulation was run on a 753 lattice with toroidal
geometry. The points, both X’s and O’s, indicate parameter values simulated and used to train an
SVM. Points indicated by X’s are the support vectors, nearest the decision boundary.
Figure 4: Cell types present at equilibrium in Glioblastoma game for k = 0.5
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In Figure 3b, we plot some trajectories on the simplex to get a feel for how the frequencies
evolve in time. The frequencies seem to approach equilibrium asymptotically, without exe-
cuting a random walk on the simplex. The stable fixed point is interesting, as we can see
the frequencies spiral into the center, where we might expect stochastic fluctuations around
the fixed point. It would be interesting to compare these flows to that of the mean-field
ODE model in future work. Looking at the actual spatial arrangement of cells in Figure 3a,
we see that the degree of clustering has increased compared to the initial condition. Where
the three cell types coexisted, clustering stabilized between 0.4 and 0.6, suggesting that the
simulation is on a large enough lattice to capture the spatial structure.
Ignoring all behavior except coexistence or lack thereof, we can create a phase diagram from
spatial simulation. We want to draw a boundary between points with different qualitative
behavior. A natural choice is to draw the boundary such that examples of different cate-
gories are divided by a gap that is as wide as possible, so that future classification of unknown
points is robust to small perturbations. More specifically, suppose we have points xi ∈ Rn,
belonging to one of two classes. Consider the convex hull of each class. The boundary we
want is the perpendicular bisector of the segment joining the closest points in each convex
hull. This is a linear programming problem that creates a classifier called a Support Vector
Machine (SVM). This is a non-probabilistic binary linear classifier with an implementation
in the R statistical language [7].
Simulation is time-consuming, so we can use an SVM to draw boundaries based on limited
data. In the case of a linear boundary, this is known as the maximum-margin hyperplane [4].
Nonlinear boundaries are also possible with kernel techniques. If there exists no hyperplane
that can split the data, we can try a soft margin that allows misclassification of points, with
a specified cost for doing so. The output of the model is not very noisy, and we expect
to have few mis-labelled points, so we impose a very strict cost for misclassification when
training the model. In our examples, there are usually more than 2 classes, while SVM is a
binary classifier. Thus, we consider a series of binary classification problems instead, using
the one-vs-one method. That is, for k different classes, k(k− 1)/2 different binary classifiers
are trained (for distinguishing between each pair of classes). Majority vote is used to classify
new points or draw decision boundaries.
Many important features of the ODE model do not change with the introduction of space.
However, based on the results for two species competition, we expected that the introduction
of spatial consideration would be like a change in the game matrix – potentially altering the
critical values of the parameters. First consider Figure 4, which is in terms of c and n, for
k = 0.5. Cyclic competition was not observed. In this regime, the Glycolytic cells won. The
region where coexistence was possible was much wider, as was the region where AG took
over. Coexistence between AG and INV was very rare as a result, with only a small region
near c = 0. The transition at k < n is similar to the mean-field approximation, where GLY
becomes favored over AG. However, the mean-field model suggests there should be cyclic
competition where c > 0.5, so GLY beats AG, AG beats INV, and INV beats GLY. The
transition at c = 0.5 is also similar. As expected, all 3 types cannot coexist in the event
that AG dominates INV.The equilibrium of INV and GLY is not seen, as for k = 0.5, it
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is sufficient that n is positive for AG to be able to invade this equilibrium. One important
difference is that coexistence seems to be possible for a wider range of constraints. The
constraint k < cn/(1− c) implies that we need
n >
1
2c
− 1
2
This yields a value of n > 1 for c < 1
3
, but the spatial model permits coexistence in this
parameter regime. This is consistent with previous work on stochastic spatial models in biol-
ogy and economics, especially in the prisoner’s dilemma[10]. We can have a fugitive species
dynamic [12]. Defectors beat cooperators and increase in frequency. Cooperators exist only
in small patches. When defectors almost take over, they have lower fitness than that of the
cooperator colonies, as there are no cooperators to exploit. The cooperator colonies then
grow, but they are exploited by lingering defectors. This gives rise to coexistence that is
impossible in a mean-field model. Durrett and Levin showed that the limiting PDE of an
IPS model of this system can have a stable interior fixed point with both types, where the
mean-field ODE does not [9].
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AG−INV
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INV−GLY
Glycolytic Mean−Field Phase Diagram for c = 0.4
(a) We have two regions with 2-species equilibria, separated by a region in which all three can
coexist.
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0.75
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0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
n
k
Equilibrium
AG
AG−INV−GLY
Cyclic
GLY
INV−GLY
Glycolytic Mean−Field Phase Diagram for c = 0.6
(b) For a large cost of motility, we see more exotic behavior, with potential cyclic competition
Figure 5: Cell types present at equilibrium of mean-field ODE model for indicated parameters
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Phase Diagram for c = 0.4
Figure 6: Cell types present at equilibrium in simulated spatial Glioblastoma game
n k ∆AG ∆INV ∆GLY
0.8 0.4 -0.24 -0.11 0.35
0.8 0.6 -0.44 0.02 0.41
1 0.6 -0.4 -0.02 0.42
0.9 0.6 -0.39 -0.03 0.42
0.7 0.5 -0.42 0.0 0.42
0.8 0.7 -0.5 0.1 0.4
0.6 0.5 -0.62 0.02 0.6
Table 1: Consider simulations where all three cell types coexist. For c = 0.4 and given
n, k: we compute a ∆ for each cell type. This gives the difference between the observed
frequencies in the spatial model and the predicted frequencies at the fixed point of the
replicator equation.
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We can also look at the phase diagram in terms of n and k for fixed c. There are two
qualitatively different pictures for c < 1
2
and c ≥ 1
2
, shown in Figure 5. For c < 1
2
, we can
either have an AG-INV equilibrium or an INV-GLY equilibrium, with a region of coexistence
between all types in between. Spatial simulations shown in Figure 6 suggest that INV does
not coexist with AG or GLY almost anywhere. Instead, AG or INV will take over, with a
regime where all three coexist in between. Here, coexistence occurs in a narrower parameter
regime, for higher values of k. There is a wider range in which GLY takes over. One
interesting point is that the invadability condition for the AG-INV equilibrium seems to be
unimportant. The transition between AG taking over and other outcomes occurs at the line
k = c
1−cn =
2
3
n in the mean-field case. In simulation, the transition in the spatial case seems
to occur at k = n, the transition where GLY dominates AG. The region where all 3 coexist in
the spatial model corresponds to a region where the fixed point in the replicator ODE does
not exist, as the predicted frequency of GLY is negative. Thus, the observed equilibrium
frequencies are quite different, as shown in Table 1.
Case 2: Myeloma Game
In a 2009 paper, Dingli et al. apply EGT to multiple myeloma evolution [8]. Multiple
myeloma (MM) cells interact with the body’s osteoclast (OC) and osteoblast (OB) cells,
which are important in normal bone remodelling. When there are no MM cells, there is a
stable equilibrium between OC and OB cells. MM cells promote the growth of OC cells by
secreting osteoclast activating factors (OAF’s) like interleukin 1β, RANKL, and MIP-1α.
MM cells also hinder OB differentiation by secreting Dickkopf-1 [8]. OC cells produce IL-6
and osteopontin to promote MM growth. The frequency-dependent interactions of the three
cell types can be treated as an evolutionary game with a payoff matrix encapsulating the
above information. Dingli further assumes that interactions between cells of the same type
incur no cost or benefit. We can write the following payoff matrix, which captures the result
of these interactions.
A =

OC OB MM
OC 0 a b
OB e 0 −d
MM c 0 0

Dingli reduces the above matrix, A, to the minimal matrix, B, through the projective trans-
formation Bij =
Aij
φj
where φ =
(
e a be
c
)
. This yields a matrix with 2 parameters.
B =

0 1 β
1 0 −δ
β 0 0

The projective transformation moves the location of the fixed point, without changing the
replicator dynamics or stability [11]. The dynamics can be divided into three regimes. For
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β < 1 and β+δ < 1, an equilibrium between OC and OB is a globally attracting fixed point.
For β > 1, an OC-MM equilibrium is globally attracting. Finally, for β < 1 and β + δ < 1,
we have bi-stability between an OB-OC equilibrium and an OC-MM equilibrium.
In the spatial case, things look different, mainly because of the absence of bi-stability. In-
stead, for each β < 1, there is a critical δ at which the equilibrium shifts from OC-OB to
OC-MM, seen in Figure 9. Trajectories for both possible equilibria are shown in Figure 7a.
The spatial structure shown in Figure 7b is interesting. There is essentially a competition
between an OC-MM cluster and an OC-OB cluster. Due to this structure, and the fact that
each 2-strategy equilibrium has symmetric payoffs, clustering is very close to 0.5.
(a) Sample trajectories for each attracting basin from the spatial model. Each trajectory begins at
the center and is for a different choice of parameters.
(b) Sample output from simulation before equilibrium. Red are OC, Blue are OB, and Green are
MM. OC and MM cluster together, as do OC and OB. One of these two-species combos will take
over.
Figure 7
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β
Equilibrium
Bistable
OC−MM
OC−OB
Myeloma Mean−Field Phase Diagram
(a) Equilibrium cell types in the ODE model. A region of bistability separates regions where each
2-species equilbrium is globally stable.
Myeloma Spatial Phase Diagram
(b) Equilibrium cell types in spatial simulation. The region wherethere is an OC-OB equilbrium
extends into the bistable region of the ODE model.
Figure 8: Cell types present at equilibrium in Myeloma game
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Case 3: Toxin Game
Tomlinson and Bodmer [15]1 consider the following example, where one cell produces a toxin
that harms other tumor cells – receiving a payoff.
We have three types of cells
1. Producers (P) secrete a toxin
2. Resistant (R) cells to the above toxin
3. Baseline (B) cells neither produce nor resist the toxin
We have the following interaction terms. All terms are assumed to be positive.
• z : Baseline fitness
• e : Cost of producing toxin
• g : Payoff of poisoning another cell. We have g > e, as the toxin would otherwise not
be produced.
• h : Cost of resisting the toxin
• f : Effect of toxin on non-resistant cells
We have the payoff matrix,
A =

P R B
P z − e− f + g z − e z − e+ g
R z − h z − h z − h
B z − f z z

We add constants to each column to set the diagonals to 0. Then, we have the reduced
matrix
A =

0 h− e g − e
f − k − h 0 −h
e− g h 0

As before, we can consider the pairwise interaction of each cell pair.
1. R vs. B
B dominates R since h > 0
2. P vs. B
P dominates B since k > 0
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3. P vs. R
Here, the picture is more interesting. First, suppose that h > e.
If h− e > f − g, P dominates R.
Otherwise, we have a stable fixed point at
p∗P =
h− e
f − g
p∗R =
e+ f − g − h
f − g
Now we need to check if this equilibrium is invadable by B. The fitnesses of P and R are
equal at the fixed point, so we have
FP = FR =
(h− e)(e+ f − g − h)
f − g
FB =
h− e
f − g (e− g) +
e+ f − g − h
f − g h
If the fitness of B is greater near the equilibrium, the equilbrium is invadable. Note that
f − g > 0. To meet the invadability condition, FB > FP , we need
e
g
>
h
f
Otherwise, the equilibrium is attracting.
Now, consider h < e.
If h− e > f − g, we have an unstable fixed point on the P-R boundary, so P will dominate.
Otherwise, R will dominate P, leading to a cyclic competition between the three types, like
rock-paper-scissors. Fixing e = 0.2 and g = 0.4, we can see most qualitatively different
behaviors in the mean-field model (Figure 9a).
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(a) Equilibrium cell types in mean-field model.
Toxin Phase Diagram
(b) Equilibrium cell types for spatial simulation.
Figure 9: Cell types present at equilibrium in Toxin game for e = 0.2 and g = 0.4.
In this case, simulations show much less varied behavior than the mean-field model would
suggest. There is a transition between regimes where P or R takes over. Three strategies do
not coexist anywhere, and there is a slim region where P and R can coexist.
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Conclusion
We have introduced a stochastic spatial model for a generic evolutionary game and applied
it to the interplay of phenotypes in tumor growth. The mean-field approximation agrees
with many of the features of the interacting particle system, including certain critical pa-
rameters for which the coexistence changes. The spatial structure facilitated coexistence in
the Glioblastoma game, making it possible for a wider range of parameters. On the other
hand, structure made coexistence impossible in the Toxin game. In bi-stable systems like
the Myeloma game, we can observe a phase transition that depends on the parameters, in
lieu of actual bi-stability. In the Glioblastoma and Toxin games, coexistence between two
cell types was more uncommon in spatial simulation.
These differences are somewhat expected. Results that derived a limiting PDE assumed
weak selection, which was not used in simulation. In addition, the limiting PDE can in
general have an altered game matrix.
Tumors are known to exhibit varying degrees of heterogeneity, with multiple cell types in
complex spatial arrangements. Spatial considerations can change the qualitative features
of an evolutionary game, explaining this coexistence better than a simple mean-field ap-
proach. A game-theoretic approach could offer clinical insights into the relationship between
cancerous phenotypes. New methods of treatment could attempt to change the parameters
of this evolutionary game, enabling the tumor to select malignant phenotypes out on its own.
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